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Abstract This paper asks to what extent institutional features that facilitate tax evasion
may keep Leviathan governments at bay. The specific feature we look at is banking secrecy
abroad. The analysis draws on a 16-generation OLG model in which tax rates are determined
in a repeated game between voters and a rent-seeking Leviathan government. Key insights
are: (1) Effects on any generation alive when change takes place may differ substantially
from steady-state effects that accrue for generations yet to be born. (2) There is considerable
intergenerational diversity in these effects that is not monotonic as we move from young
to old. Combined, these results suggest that the political economy of pertinent institutional
change may be quite complex.
Keywords Leviathan government · Income tax · Tax evasion · Public spending · Rent
seeking
1 Introduction
This paper’s key question is whether opportunities for tax evasion, such as through bank
accounts protected by bank secrecy laws, may lower tax rates and provide an effective check
on government spending. The rationale for asking this question is that such effects may
improve welfare. This could only be the case, of course, if taxes and government spending
levels were excessive in the sense that they are not representative of what individuals actually
want. For this to happen, imperfections in the political market or process are required that
generate an upward bias in public spending and tax rates.
The claim that banking secrecy does foreign countries a service as well by reducing
the effective tax burden of its citizens and keeping their Leviathan governments in check
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is a familiar part of the political rhetoric of tax haven countries. However, the argument
has also been advanced in academic work, as exemplified by Boadway and Keen (1998),
who conclude that their results “may point . . . to a useful social purpose for tax havens”. In
their model, in which only capital income is subject to taxation, the government is unable
to commit to a tax rate ex ante, before households make their saving decision. Households
do anticipate the imbedded incentive to raise taxes after savings decisions have been made.
As a result, there is a bias in tax rates that puts them above the socially optimal rate that
would obtain if a proper commitment devise existed (see also Fischer 1980; Rogers 1987;
Chari et al. 1989). The solution recommended by Boadway and Keen is for the government
to precommit to a low level of enforcement of existing tax laws, which they consider easier
than precommitment to a lower tax rate, and this way facilitate tax evasion and generate a
lower effective tax rate.
This is a strong and potentially provocative result. In order to gauge its robustness and
shed additional light on the issue of national and international repercussions of banking se-
crecy and tax evasion in general, this paper moves beyond the model employed by Boadway
and Keen (1998), both in the way the macroeconomy is being modeled, and with respect to
the emphasis it allots to the political process.
Regarding the economy, Boadway and Keen (1998) use a representative agent, two-
period partial equilibrium framework in which income and the capital stock are exogenous.
Our analysis features an infinite horizon general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
households. This permits a more comprehensive analysis of macroeconomic steady-state
effects, a first look at intergenerational conflict, and, due to the inclusion of 16 generations,
the derivation of quite realistic and refined medium-run dynamics.
The political process does not play an explicit role in the Boadway and Keen (1998)
paper. Implicitly, though, the fact that the government and society share identical preferences
may be attributed to perfect competition in the political arena. As stated above, a Leviathan
effect obtains because socially optimal low tax rates are not time consistent. This causes
an upward bias in tax rates that not only voters but the government as well would like to
get rid of. Hence, there is no conflict of interest between the government and the electorate,
and anything that weakens the mechanisms provoking the tax bias helps cutting Leviathan
down to size. Such conflict is at the very core of our model, however. Mainly as a driving
force behind the game the rent-seeking government (that benefits from high tax rates) plays
with the voting public (who tries to prevent costly lame-duck behavior on the part of the
government). But also because institutional change bears differently on generations alive
and generations yet to be born, and may even have quite contrasting effects on different
generations currently alive. All this renders the issue of how to reduce the Leviathan effect
a lot more complex and interesting.
In order to achieve maximum leverage for any results that might obtain from this pa-
per’s analysis, we model Leviathan government in its most extreme form, postulating that
the public wants no public spending at all, and all public spending is the sole result of rent-
seeking behavior by politicians. The specific description of the political process we employ
is the electoral control model proposed by Ferejohn (1986) used extensively in the perti-
nent literature. This game-theoretic specification of how voters and the government interact
is combined with a 16-generation overlapping generations model in which generations are
born one election period apart to match the rhythm in which political decisions are being
made. The added benefit from equipping the economy with a relatively large set of heteroge-
neous agents spaced apart by relatively short periods only is that it generates rather detailed
dynamics, provides insights into intergenerational diversity and the political prospects for
institutional change, and may serve as a point of departure for future work that looks at
political decision processes explicitly and more closely.
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The idea that governments should be thought of as self-serving Leviathans rather than
as maximisers of social welfare has a long history in political philosophy.1 Explanations of
why the size of the government sector may be excessive abound in the public choice lit-
erature, ranging from Tullock’s (1967) emphasis on rent-seeking activities via Niskanen’s
(1971) focus on the role of budget-maximizing behavior to Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980)
hypothesis that, in the absence of constitutional constraints on the power of politicians, lack
of competition among decentralized government units may be the culprit.2 Our topic is also
related to the literature on tax competition and information exchange, but this literature
usually maintains that each country’s government seeks to maximize the utility of its inhab-
itants. Moreover, our concern is not to analyze the strategic interaction of different countries
(see Bacchetta and Espinosa 1995, 2000; Kollintzas et al. 2000; Huizinga and Nielsen 2003;
Marchand et al. 2003; Eggert and Kolmar 2004), but to investigate how changes between
different regimes of information exchange impact different groups.
Section 2 develops our overlapping generations model with Leviathan government, gives
some analytical results, and discusses steady states as they obtain with and without tax eva-
sion opportunities. Section 3 looks at dynamics. For that purpose, we simulate a calibrated
numerical version and track both the response of aggregate variables and the behavior of in-
dividual generations to institutional change toward and away from arrangements with bank-
ing secrecy. Section 4 sums up and provides an outlook on possible future refinements and
extensions.
2 An OLG model with Leviathan government
2.1 The economy
We use a small open economy overlapping generations (OLG) model featuring 16 genera-
tions. The reason why we are looking at more than the two generations often employed in
OLG models is that this permits us to look at transition dynamics and generational diversity
in a realistic fashion. Sixteen generations seem appropriate for our purposes, as they insin-
uate a period length of some four years, the length of an election period, which plays a key
role in our model. A new generation is born at the beginning of a new election term. Each
generation supplies a fixed labor input which is normalized to 1 during the first 12 periods
of its lifetime.3 After that it retires and lives solely from its savings plus interest. Individuals
are born without wealth and leave no bequests. For ease of notation we identify generations
by noting how many periods they have left to live after the current period. Accordingly, the
oldest generation is generation 0, while generation 15 is the youngest. Net output per worker
at time t , yt , is generated by a Cobb-Douglas production function
yt = kαt − δkt , (1)
1Typical citations are taken from the writings of Thomas Hobbes, who first likened the government to the
biblical monster, James Stuart Mill and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
2The question of how to limit Leviathan also has a long tradition in the public choice literature. The wide
range of remedies suggested, which reflect the multitude of potential causes of an excessive size and scope
of government, are comprehensively surveyed in Racheter and Wagner (1999).
3Fixing each generations supply of labor is needed to keep the model tractable and is standard in OLG
models. Ruling out this specific source of legal tax avoidance at the same time ensures that no Laffer-type
relation between the tax rate and the tax base exists. We are confident that the qualitative properties of the
results presented in papers are robust to such an extension as long as we operate on the rising segment of the
Laffer curve. Things may look different, though, if we move beyond.
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where kt is the capital stock per worker, α is capital’s share of output, and δ denotes the
depreciation rate. Both capital and labor markets are perfectly competitive, so that both
production factors are reimbursed at their marginal productivity. Accordingly,
rt = αkα−1t − δkt , wt = (1 − α)kαt ,
where rt is the real period (not annualized) interest rate and wt is the wage rate. Declared
wage and interest income is taxed at a flat period rate τt . Wage income is always fully
declared, while, depending on the judicial setting, households may or may not use means
such as banking secrecy to evade taxes on interest income. We assume that tax evasion
generates a period cost of 12ζf
2 per unit of assets hidden in secret bank accounts, where f
is the fraction of assets the household hides from the authorities.4 This implies an optimal
tax evasion rate of
ft = rt τt
ζ
.
The resulting after-tax interest and wage rates are given by
rnet,t = ((1 − τt )(1 − ft ) + ft )rt − 12ζf
2
t ,
wnet,t = (1 − τt )wt .
Each country’s size is negligible compared to the world economy. We assume perfect capital
markets and that capital income is taxed according to residence. International interest rate
parity requires that the per worker capital stock is level across countries, so unilateral policy
choices will not have an impact on output or wages.
In general equilibrium models with government, households typically derive utility from
private consumption and their government’s provision of public goods. The lifetime utility
of the representative member of generation n is given by
Vn =
n∑
j=0
βj (log cn−j,t+j + ψ loggt+j ), (2)
where cn−j,t+j is period t +j consumption of generation n−j , gt+j the level of public good
provision per capita in the same period, ψ the weight of public goods in households’ utility,
and βh households’ subjective time-discount factor. An extreme, pure Leviathan model ob-
tains if we let ψ equal zero. Then government spending generates no utility for households
at all. We denote the net wealth (the sum of the market value of assets held and future net
wage earnings discounted at the after tax interest rate) of a representative individual of gen-
eration n by νn. Since the youngest generation starts out without any assets, its net wealth,
ν15,t is given solely by the discounted value of future net salaries
ν15,t =
12∑
j=0
(1 − τt+j )wnet,t+j∏j
i=1(1 + rnet,t+i )
.
4The costs of tax evasion come in many forms. They involve the risk of punishment for evading taxes in the
spirit of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), psychological costs of deviating from personal norms (Schnellenbach
2006), losses resulting from the need to conceal the buying power from this kind of illegal income by putting
it to inefficient use, and, probably most directly, withholding taxes levied by the country that is offering secret
bank accounts.
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As we show in Appendix A, the optimal consumption of generation n individuals is given
by
cn,t = 1 − β1 − βn+1 νn,t . (3)
The fraction of wealth that any generation consumes during a given time period, (1 − β)/
(1 − βn+1), decreases with the number of periods it has left to live and is higher the more
households discount future consumption (β). In the last period the generation consumes
all its remaining wealth, while for young generations, the fraction consumed approaches
(1 − β). The generation’s wealth next period will be given by the part of current wealth not
consumed plus the interest income they receive on this, or
νn−1,t+1 = (1 + rnet,t+1)β − β
n+1
1 − βn+1 νn,t . (4)
Net interest rates, as determinants of net wealth, depend on income tax rates. These
are determined in a game between voters and the government which we now describe and
analyze.
2.2 The game between voters and the government
In order to provide an explanation of tax rates with Leviathan-government flavor, this section
augments the OLG model described above with a version of Ferejohn’s (1986) electoral
control model. This model has become a staple in political macroeconomics with a wide
range of applications (e.g., Rogoff 1990 or Persson et al. 2000). It assumes that politicians
are pure rentseekers. When in power, they have the discretion to tax net income at any rate
they deem appropriate. But the constitution prevents them from the outright expropriation
of private assets.5
Politicians maximize income. When in office, income comes in two forms: First, they
receive an explicit salary which they cannot influence. For the sake of parsimony, we as-
sume that it equals the salary they could earn in private-sector positions. Second, politicians
can gain additional income by pursuing activities which favor special consumer or producer
groups. We are interested in this second type of income, generated through rent-seeking
behavior. These rents may accrue openly and legally, say as payments from recipients of
government contracts in the form of campaign contributions, promises of future employ-
ment, or lecture fees (Stigler 1971; Barro 1973). In countries with weak legal rules and
enforcement, in particular, such income may also arrive through concealed, illegal channels,
such as bribes and other forms of corruption. Following Barro (1973) we let government
rent be generated through factor overpayment in public procurement. It is thus proportional
to (certain parts of) government spending.
When determining government spending, we assume that the government budget must
balance on a period-by-period basis, which, in our context, means over an election term. For
5Of course, an appropriately designed constitution may restrict overtaxation as well. Brennan and Buchanan
(1980) discuss this issue in considerable detail. Our approach is a positive one, proposing a constitutional
design with the main features we observe in real life, even if these are suboptimal by the standards of Brennan
and Buchanan, for whatever reason. In our reading the majority of constitutions in industrial countries do
prohibit outright expropriation while leaving some leeway for government spending and tax policies. This
leads us to the question whether opening venues for tax evasion may be a second-best optimum.
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a tax base bt and a tax rate τt , government spending per capita is thus given by
gt = τtbt . (5)
Further, assume that some part of government spending is not discretionary, but mandated
by a country’s legal commitments (schools, public hospitals, etc.), by international treaties
or standards suggested by supranational institutions. Let this part of government spending
be fixed at g¯ and assume that such non-discretionary spending does not generate rent for the
government. So rents are linear in that part of government spending that exceeds the legal
minimum. The period t rent ξt generated by such discretionary spending is thus given by
ξt = ξ(gt − g¯) = ξ(τtbt − g¯). (6)
Within a given period (or term in office), the government would maximize its rent by driving
up the tax rate to 100%. This short-run incentive is counterbalanced by its desire to get re-
elected and thus be able to collect rents in the future as well. Voters are aware of this tradeoff
and adopt a simple performance-oriented (retrospective) voting rule: If the tax rate τt set
by the government does not exceed a threshold τ¯t , the current government gets reelected.
Otherwise it receives zero votes and a new government is elected from an infinite pool of
other parties. Once out of office, a former government never returns to power. There are no
mechanisms by which a government can credibly pre-commit to a policy unless it is ex-post
rational. The timing of this simple game is visualized by the sequence of events given in
Fig. 1.
Given the voting rule mentioned above, the reigning rent-seeking government has two
options: First, to maximize the current period rent by setting τ = 100%, and accept being
voted out of office. Second, to settle for a lower tax rate τ¯t that gets it reelected. Choosing
a tax rate below τ¯t will never be optimal, of course, because a marginal increase in the
tax rate would increase revenues without impeding chances for reelection. Also, no rational
government will ever pick a tax rate in the range between τ¯t and 100%, because a tax rate
of 100% provides higher rents and identical reelection prospects.
The challenge for the electorate is to set incentives for the government in such a manner
that it always opts for a tax rate of τ¯t and never for one of 100%. The criterion for this can be
found by recursion. Given that it will be optimal for the government to choose τt+j = τ¯t+j
in all future periods t + j and that its discount rate is βg , this choice is also optimal at time t
if the maximal current period rent does not exceed the present value of the stream of future
rents when in power. Formally,
ξ(bt − g¯) ≤
∞∑
j=0
βjg ξ(τ¯t+j bt+j − g¯). (7)
Fig. 1 The game between voters
and the government: sequence of
events
Public Choice (2008) 136: 103–122 109
From the perspective of the electorate, this is the incentive compatibility constraint. The
optimal tax rate τ¯t is the one that makes (7) hold with equality. Rearranging (7) gives
τ¯t = 1 − 1
bt
∞∑
j=1
βjg τ¯t+j bt+j +
βg
1 − βg
g¯
bt
. (8)
Equation (8) provides some insights at to why τ¯ might fluctuate over time. The second term
will be larger (in an absolute sense), the smaller the current tax base is relative to its long-run
value. This reflects the fact that incumbents have more to gain from staying in office when
the tax base is rising. As we can see from the last term, a growing tax base leads to lower tax
rates, as the fraction of revenues necessary to cover non-discretionary spendings decreases.
Our political-economic OLG model can be used to identify government behavior and the
state of the economy under different institutional settings. We look at two such settings. The
first one does not provide windows of opportunity for tax evasion. Here f , the fraction of
wealth concealed from tax authorities, equals zero. And the other setting is one in which
such opportunity presents itself, as would be the case when foreign countries offer secret
bank accounts. Here f is optimally chosen by households given the cost function for tax
evasion. We start by briefly discussing steady states under the two institutional settings. We
then proceed to look at the dynamic responses triggered when one institutional setting is
dropped in favor of the other.
2.3 Steady states with and without banking secrecy
Steady-state solutions are obtained by removing all time indices. Doing this in (8) yields the
steady-state tax rate
τ¯ = (1 − βg) + βg g¯
b
. (9)
Without banking secrecy (or with banking secrecy and information exchange between coun-
tries), the tax base equals GDP. The larger the fraction f of interest income hidden from the
tax man, the lower is the tax base relative to GDP, and the higher is the tax rate set by the
government in equilibrium. Hence, part of the revenue lost due to tax evasion is recaptured
through higher official tax rates.
The labor supply is fixed in our setup. So the effect of tax evasion on GDP, on the gross
wage rate, and on the gross interest rate will be determined by its effect on the capital stock.6
In the new steady state with tax evasion, taxes are shifted from capital income to labor. This
is because the tax rate effectively paid on wage income equals the official tax rate, while
the tax rate effectively paid on interest income, part of which evades being taxed, is below
the official tax rate. This raises effective post-tax interest rates, which translates into higher
savings rates.
Since subsequent sections report dynamic effects relative to steady states, it is useful to
note that while aggregates do not change in the steady state, intra-generational dynamics
occur nevertheless. Since the discussion of dynamic responses to institutional change in
Sect. 3 requires a calibrated version of our model, we also provide quantitative steady-state
patterns here for reference. To this end, the model is calibrated as follows: The production
6We noted above that each individual country is small, so that its repercussions on the global economy are
negligible. When all individual countries respond in the same way, however, this does affect the global capital
stock.
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function parameter α is set to 0.3. Capital depreciates by 40% each period (12% per year).
Non-discretionary government spending (g¯) is set to 45% of the equilibrium GDP under
banking secrecy. The government discount factor is set to 10/11, which gives a steady-state
tax rate with banking secrecy of 50%. The households’ discount factor is calibrated to match
an annual interest rate of 0.04 with banking secrecy; this is achieved at βh = 0.9120. The
parameter ζ in the cost function is calibrated to generate a tax evasion fraction of 0.1; this
is achieved at a ζ of 0.85. The solution algorithms we use are described in Appendix B.
The solid line in Fig. 2 has two interpretations. The first is timeless, since it indicates the
consumption levels of the sixteen generations alive at an arbitrary point in time, after the
economy has settled into a steady-state without banking secrecy. The youngest generation
is positioned on the left and the oldest on the right. This line may also be given a dynamic
interpretation. Since households move from left to right as they get older, the line also shows
the lifetime consumption profile of a representative household. The fact that consumption
falls during a household’s life implies that our calibration generates a steady-state real in-
terest rate that falls short of the time discount rate. The dashed line provides the same kind
of information for a steady state with banking secrecy. The fact that the pattern has become
flatter indicates that the effective post-tax real interest rate has increased. It still remains
below the time discount rate, though, since households continue to favor early consumption.
For those generations who work, the higher official tax rates mean lower net wage rates,
but the effect of the higher effective interest rate on the savings rate turns out to be strong
enough to compensate for this effect for all generations. The upshot is a higher capital stock
with secret bank accounts. Through the production function, a higher capital stock also
drives up GDP and the wage rate, but has a dampening effect on the interest rate.
3 Dynamic responses to institutional change
Lifetime in OLG models is finite, and many, if not all, generations currently alive may not
live to enjoy whatever promises a distant new steady state may bear. When discussing the
welfare implications of institutional change, therefore, and even more so when evaluating
prospects for its political implementation, we need to look at the model’s dynamics. For this
purpose, the current section analyzes the transition paths to (from) an institutional design
Fig. 2 Steady state consumption profiles
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with banking secrecy from (to) one without (or with) information exchange, in a numerical
version of our model.
3.1 Introducing banking secrecy
3.1.1 Aggregate dynamics
Figure 3 shows how tax rates, the tax base, the capital stock and consumption respond to
the establishment of secret bank accounts. All time paths are relative to the steady-state
patterns that obtain without banking secrecy. In period −1 the economy is still in a steady
state without any opportunities for tax evasion. In period 0 the government and households
learn that from next period on secret bank accounts will be available. Households respond
to this by keeping a fraction f of their assets in such accounts in period 1 and after. For now
we assume that this reallocation takes time, so that households respond to what they learned
with a lag of one period.
The upper-left panel shows that the tax rate spikes in the announcement period, period 0.
It drops in period 1, and then recedes slowly toward its new equilibrium value, which is
higher than the old one. This observed initial spike is due to the drop in politicians’ rent
anticipated to follow the future opening of channels for tax evasion. In period 0, households
have not had the opportunity yet to react to this opening. The tax base, the sum of wage and
interest income, therefore, is still the same as in the previous steady state. In this old steady
state, voters disciplined the government by letting it tax just enough to render it indifferent
between the tax rate that is moderate enough to get the government reelected at all future
elections, and a tax rate of 100%, followed by being ousted from office at the next election.
Politicians know that tax evasion made possible by secret bank accounts will eat into the
tax base in the near future. So, unless voters adjust the tax rate at which they reelect the
government (τ¯0), the incentive compatibility constraint of inequality (7) will be violated.
The initial spike also impedes wealth accumulation and reverberates in the following
periods in the form of an initially lower capital stock (lower-left panel). This adds to the
drop in the tax base that follows households shift of assets abroad (upper-right panel). As
we move ahead in time, the capital stock not only rebounds, but soars above its initial level
thanks to the lower effective tax rate that banking secrecy implies. This slight rebound of
the tax base is perfectly foreseen, and, as we know from the discussion of (8), will lead to a
further decrease in tax rates as a smaller fraction of revenues needs to be set aside to cover
non-discretionary spending.
Aggregate consumption (lower-right panel) is initially also dented by the initial tax hike,
but also by a temporal shift in households’ consumption profiles (see below). After some
periods below the old level, it recovers as the effect of the consumption shifts are smoothed
out, the tax burden eases, and aggregate wealth reaches its new, higher long-run level.
The key lesson to be taken from the figure is how the equilibrium tax rate tracks future
shifts in the tax base. If, as initially, the current tax base is higher than that of the next few
periods, incentive compatibility requires τ¯ to be increased. If, as from period 2 on, the tax
base is on an ascending trajectory, politicians would be willing to accept temporarily lower
tax rates, but this effect will be muted or dominated by a decrease in the fraction of revenues
needed to cover basic government services over time.
3.1.2 Generational dynamics
Aggregate dynamics, as given in Fig. 3, provide an incomplete picture in an OLG model.
First, because different generations alive deviate from the average or benefit from the av-
erage in different ways. And second, because even if all generations’ consumption would
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exactly follow the path of aggregate consumption shown in Fig. 3, each generation would
be able to move along this path for a different length of time. Thus the present value of
consumption dynamics triggered by the introduction of banking secrecy abroad would be
different for each generation. This section, therefore, looks behind the aggregates shown in
Fig. 3 and discusses how each generation’s consumption is being affected.
The lower panel of Fig. 4 shows the present values of the effect on consumption ordered
by generation.7 Interestingly, the effect is not monotonic in the sense that it changes in one
direction as we move from younger toward older generations. Both the oldest generation
and the eleven youngest generations suffer from the introduction of banking secrecy. The
four other generations do welcome banking secrecy. To understand this pattern, it helps to
note that those who benefit are the generations who will still be alive when banking secrecy
eventually is implemented, which happens in period 1, and will then have to make a liv-
Fig. 3 Introducing banking secrecy: the aggregate perspective
7For each generation, this is computed as the percentage shift in the consumption path from the previous
steady state that would make it indifferent between remaining in the old regime and switching to the regime
with secret bank accounts. Denoting the hypothetical consumption that would have accrued in the old steady
state by cˆ we find the equivalent overall consumption change by solving
n∑
j=0
β
j
h
log cj =
n∑
j=0
β
j
h
log(cˆj (1 + 
n))
for 
n. This yields

n = 1 − βh
1 − βn+1
h
n∑
j=0
β
j
h
(log cj − log cˆj ).
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ing out of interest income and accumulated wealth alone. Those who suffer are the other
generations. The generation shown on the far left lives during the period when the imple-
mentation of banking secrecy is announced (but not yet implemented) and the government
responds by raising tax rates. This lowers their disposable income and consumption, which
remains the only effect they experience before they pass away. The eleven youngest gener-
ations will all still have to work under banking secrecy and pay higher taxes and save out
of lower disposable incomes during that time. This apparently dominates all positive effects
banking secrecy may have on their consumption via a build-up of the capital stock and lower
effective tax rates during their years of retirement.
To provide an even more detailed picture, the upper panel shows consumption paths
for each individual generation. Note that these are deviations from the no-banking-secrecy
steady-state consumption paths shown in Fig. 4. So while paths in the top panel of Fig. 3
are predominantly ascending, the increase is relative to the descending steady-state paths of
Fig. 4. Since these steady-state paths descend more steeply, this dominates the steady-state
paths with banking secrecy still. So consumption falls during the remaining lifetime for most
generations, but less so in a scenario without banking secrecy.
Let us first look at the uppermost path which is actually four paths stacked on top of one
another. Paths have been deliberately displaced slightly to make it even more apparent that
we are looking at four paths rather than one. The four paths are for the four generations al-
ready in retirement when the future implementation of banking secrecy is being announced.
These generations are all being affected in the same way each period, but for a different
number of periods.
All retired generations live by consuming wealth accumulated during their working lives,
and from the interest income this wealth still generates. The oldest generation unambigu-
ously loses from the introduction of secret bank accounts. The reason is that its disposable
income is affected full force by the spike in the tax rate that hits their consumption during
their only period left to live. The three other generations also in retirement already suffer
from this blow the same way. However, they also benefit during subsequent periods from the
actual introduction of secret bank accounts. The combination of income tax rates at home
coming down again and the possibility of actually moving part of their wealth abroad lets
them enjoy lower effective tax rates for the remainder of their lives. As this drives effective
post-tax interest rates below their steady-state value, meaning that today’s consumption is
reduced in favor of more consumption tomorrow. This creates ascending consumption paths
of retired generations who live to see secret bank accounts implemented.
Intertemporal substitution of current consumption in favor of later consumption also is
the key mechanism behind the upward-sloping consumption paths of those generations who
still hold jobs in period 0. Two features need explanation there, however. First, why is the
announcement-related drop in period 0 larger the longer the remaining work life? Second,
why does consumption for generations still young continue to fall in period 1, while it is
already rising for the older working generations?
In answering the first question we note that because wage income is taxed at the official
tax rate, which increases when the introduction of bank secrecy is being announced, banking
secrecy triggers a shift of taxation from capital income to wage income. This hurts those
generations most who are still early in their careers and adds to the reduction in current
consumption that is already being caused by the anticipated rise in after-tax interest rates.
Regarding the second question, those generations with the longest working lives ahead
have not accumulated any wealth worth talking about yet. Their disposable incomes will be
affected strongly by the drop in the capital stock in period 1 and by the detrimental effect this
has on their labor income. The older a generation is and the larger its accumulated wealth,
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Fig. 4 Introducing banking secrecy: the generational perspective
the more likely this negative effect on wages will be offset by the new opportunity to move
financial wealth abroad and receive a tax-free return.
3.2 Abolishing banking secrecy
Institutional change in the opposite direction, toward an abolition of banking secrecy, simply
mirrors the patterns described above, when it is being implemented in the same fashion. In
order not to become repetitive and broaden our insights while looking at this case, we now
assume that banking secrecy is discarded unexpectedly, without previous announcement.
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Again, we start by looking at the dynamic response of aggregate variables, shown in
Fig. 5. With the regime change, happening in period 0, the tax base jumps (northeast panel),
because those parts of wealth which before were hidden from the tax man are now subject to
taxation. Reflecting this jump in the tax base, the tax rate drops (northwest panel). The dom-
inant factor in this drop is the lower fraction of revenues needed to cover non-discretionary
spendings. There is not much time variation in the subsequent movements of the tax base
or the tax rate, since both variables jump into the neighborhood of their new steady states
instantly. Whatever movement happens after is not very significant in quantitative terms and
reflects the effect of the falling capital stock on output (lower-left panel). The response of
consumption is interesting (lower-right panel). It jumps upward when banking secrecy is
abolished, reflecting the drop in the tax rate, which has not affected the capital stock yet,
and intertemporal substitution toward earlier periods for all generations.
This shift in consumption patterns is clearly recognizable in the upper panel of Fig. 6,
which looks behind aggregates at individual generations. All generations, except the five old-
est, have higher consumption in the periods immediately following the abolition of banking
secrecy, but lower consumption toward the end of their lifecycles. As with the introduction
of banking secrecy, the tilting of the consumption profiles is mainly due to changes in the
effective interest rate. Without banking secrecy it is lower because all interest income is
subject to the domestic tax rate.
The lower panel shows the winners and losers of the postulated institutional change. The
effects mirror—but not perfectly so—what we saw happening after the introduction of bank-
ing secrecy. Since we assume that banking secrecy is dropped unexpectedly, the oldest gen-
eration also loses with this policy shift. Apart from that, the pattern is more or less the oppo-
site of what happened after the introduction of banking secrecy. Retired generations, as well
Fig. 5 Abolishing banking secrecy: the aggregate perspective
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as those in the late periods of their working lives lose because they derive all or most of their
income from their financial assets. The new official tax rate is lower without banking secrecy
and this benefits the younger generations who have many working periods ahead of them.
4 Summary and outlook
The main question asked in this paper was to what extent institutional features that facilitate
tax evasion may keep Leviathan governments at bay. The specific feature we looked at was
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banking secrecy abroad, but most results would seem to apply to other institutional features
facilitating tax evasion as well. The answer to the main question depends on how one defines
Leviathan, or the government.
When taking income tax rates as a measure of government power abuse, tax evasion
feeds Leviathan. Even with an extreme specification of Leviathan governments, in which all
public spending is forced upon households and does not even enter their utility function, tax
rates go up. Since this is accompanied by a dramatically shrinking tax base, however, due to
a substantial part of income now being concealed from the tax authorities, taxes per capita
do indeed fall. Households benefit from this through higher consumption that eventually
moves beyond previous levels, made possible by a growing capital stock and lower effective
tax rates.
These are all steady-state effects, however, and some of them take substantial time to
materialize, a highly relevant aspect when lifetime is finite. Looking into this, our analysis
has shown that the effects of institutional change in terms of introducing banking secrecy, or
removing it, are quite complex. Not only may patterns differ substantially between genera-
tions, but present values of changes in consumption also depend crucially on generational
status, which defines expected remaining lifetime, on the speed at which institutional change
is conducted and on the element of surprise it contains. The immediate effect of announcing
the introduction of banking secrecy is a drop in consumption. The drop is more pronounced
the longer is the remaining lifetime of a household. For many this drop is followed by a
further fall in consumption when banking secrecy actually is implemented, and households
may never recover from these losses during later stages of their lives. When the introduction
of banking secrecy is pre-announced, the net effect on a majority of households is negative.
When the introduction catches the economy by surprise, a majority may benefit.
Future work may extend our analysis in a number of directions. For one thing, our de-
finition of Leviathan may be softened to a less extreme version. As the model stands now,
cutbacks in government spending do not matter to households, as public consumption does
not generate utility. Figures 7 and 8 offer a glimpse at how this may bear on results by show-
ing how government spending per capita responds to an announced and to a surprise removal
of banking secrecy. Dynamic and present-value effects on consumption, already shown in
Sects. 3.1 and 3.2, are also included for easy reference.
What catches the eye is the downward spike in government spending when next period’s
abolishment of banking secrecy is announced (Fig. 7). This reflects the downward spike in
the tax rate (the opposite of what we have seen in Fig. 2), and is so severe that subsequent
higher levels of government spending never make up for it during the lifetimes of all gener-
ations currently alive. This spike is absent when there is no previous announcement (Fig. 8).
Therefore, the effect on all generations is positive. What is interesting is that there seems to
be a tradeoff: A pre-announced abolishment of banking secrecy benefits most households
from the perspective of consumption, but hurts public consumption for all. Abolishment in a
surprise move hurts a majority of households from the perspective of consumption, but im-
proves public consumption for all. We need to emphasize, however, that the government’s
spending patterns have been computed in a model in which they do not yield utility. So
households do not care about the patterns shown in Figs. 7 and 8. Making public consump-
tion a determinant of household utility would also affect the game between households and
the government and bear on the paths of other variables as well.
Beyond measures of aggregate or generational welfare, any evaluation of prospects for
political change, or persistence, needs to dig deeper into the political process. Thus, future
work may make the option for institutional change part of the political game, and con-
sider the interaction between the government and the median-voter generation in an effort
to model the political part of the model more realistically.
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Appendix A: Consumers’ maximization problem
In this section we derive (3) from the consumers’ maximization problem. We proceed by
proving an expression for the value function. The optimal consumption rule will follow as
a by-product. This is a standard dynamic programming exercise and it is quite likely that it
could be found elsewhere.
Claim The value function of a generation n individual with wealth an can be written as
Vn(an,R,β) = 1 − β
n
1 − β logan + Tn({R}, β),
where Tn is a catch-all term for the exogenous variables.
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Proof [By induction] In the last period of its lifecycle, a generation consumes all its wealth.
It follows that V0(a0, {R}, β) = loga0, so part (a) of the proposition obviously holds for
j = 0. Now assume it holds for period j − 1 where j is a positive integer. It follows that
Vj (aj , {R}, β) = max
aj−1
{
log(aj − R−1j aj−1) +
β − βj
1 − β logaj−1 + βTj−1({R}, β)
}
.
The first-order condition for a maximum of the expression in braces implies that aj−1 should
be set to
aj−1 = Rj β − β
j
1 − βj aj .
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It follows that the generation consumes
cj = 1 − β1 − βj aj . (10)
Substituting for aj−1 in the value function and rearranging gives
Vj (aj , {R}, β) = logaj + log 1 − β1 − βj +
β − βj
1 − β
(
logaj + log
(
Rj
β − βj
1 − βj
))
+ βTj−1({R}, β)
= 1 − β
j
1 − β logaj + Tj ({R}, β),
which completes the inductive step and hence the proof. Since we just proved that the claim
holds, the optimal consumption rule is given by (10). 
Appendix B: Solution algorithms
B.1 Steady states
Solving for the steady states with and without banking secrecy is straightforward. From (9),
we know the equilibrium tax rate under both regimes. The only state variable in the model is
the capital stock. For a constant capital stock, the wage and interest rate, as well as consump-
tion and savings for each generation are given by the formulas in Sect. 2.1. The equilibrium
capital stock is that at which net savings over all generations is zero.
B.2 Transition dynamics
Solving for the transition dynamics between the two tax regimes is somewhat more compli-
cated. Using the solutions for the steady states, we know the starting position of the economy
(old steady state), as well as its new long-run equilibrium. At any point in time, household
savings depend on the current state of the economy as well as the expected path for capi-
tal stock and the tax rate. The path for the tax rate depends on the evolution of the capital
stock (which determines the tax base) as well as expected future tax rates. Using {kˆt+j }∞j=1,
{τˆt+j }∞j=1, to denote the expected trajectories for the capital stock and the tax rates, a so-
lution for the equilibrium transition dynamics is given when the realized paths equal their
expectations.
We use the following procedure to arrive at the equilibrium path. Let T be a period far
ahead by which all adjustment dynamics should be completed. For period T as well as all
following periods we assume that all variables are at their new equilibrium values.
1. Assume an arbitrary path of the capital stock and tax rate for the transition.
2. Compute new series for both variables as follows:
(a) For given {kˆt+j }Tj=1, {τˆt+j }Tj=1, and initial capital stock, compute aggregate period
savings. Use this number as the capital stock for the period t + 1. Then use the same
procedure to compute the capital stock for t + 2, etc. This yields a new estimate
{k˜t+j }Tj=1 for the capital trajectory, as well as an estimated trajectory for the tax base
{b˜t+j }Tj=1.
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(b) Collect the expected values in (8) into a variable B , so that, at time t ,
B =
∞∑
j=1
βjg τ¯t+j bt+j +
β
1 − β g¯.
In the new equilibrium, B is given by B = βg/(1 − βg)τ¯ssbss , where we use the sub-
script ss to denote a steady state. Starting off in period T , we compute the expected
period T tax rate by τˆT = 1−B/b˜T . Given this value for period T , we compute B for
period T − 1 as B ′ = βgτˆT bˆT + βgB . Repeating the procedure until we are back in
the period where the regime change took place yields an updated series of expected
tax rates {τˆt+j }Tj=1.
(c) Update the expected path for the capital stock by
{kˆ′t+j }Tj=1 = θ{k˜t+j }Tj=1 + (1 − θ), {kˆt+j }Tj=1,
where θ is a number in the range 0 to 1; θ should be small in order to prevent too
much oscillations of the expectations.
3. Check if for convergence by comparing {kˆ′t+j }Tj=1 to {kˆt+j }Tj=1. If not, go back to step 2.
4. Verify that the economy has converged to the new steady state well before T . If not,
increase T and start over. If yes, a solution has been found.
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